Trump's decision to table Taiwan's arms pipeline as a negotiating variable in Beijing has already answered the deterrence question that five-year invasion forecasts are still framing as open. The New York Times reported Monday that arms transfers are among the instruments Washington placed on the table in Beijing; Taiwan's Ministry of National Defense had listed sustained arms acquisition as a budget priority in its 2026 submission to the Legislative Yuan in March. Taiwan's President Lai Ching-te, who took office in May 2024 and has governed without a legislative majority since, rejected the framing through a Presidential Office statement, asserting that Taiwan's status is not negotiable by third parties. That is correct. When Washington prices deterrence as a deal item, Taipei's position is not the variable that shifts.

The five-year invasion window that unnamed US advisers circulated to media this weekend is not a new assessment. Admiral Samuel Paparo, commander of US Indo-Pacific Command since May 2024, has cited 2027 as a planning horizon in congressional testimony; the 2024 National Intelligence Council threat assessment carried the same date, with one caveat: deterrence holds if commitments hold. Marine Insight's vessel-tracking data published this week shows an elevated PLA surface presence in the Taiwan Strait, consistent with exercise posture. Beijing does not wait. The press briefing in which Taiwan's arms supply appears as a concession option already does the repricing, before any formal suspension. The next hard signal arrives when Taiwan's MND submits its revised acquisition timeline to the Legislative Yuan's National Defense Committee, which convenes June 3.