
JetBrains Tells Cadence Users To Rotate AWS Keys After TeamCity Breach
Kai Tanner on the JetBrains breach that turned a build server into a live AWS credential leak.
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A critical TeamCity vulnerability let attackers into JetBrains' build infrastructure and out the other side with AWS credentials for Cadence, exposing how CI/CD tooling has become a supply chain unto itself.
JetBrains is telling Cadence users to revoke and rotate all credentials after unidentified attackers exploited a critical, already-disclosed vulnerability in TeamCity, its continuous-integration server, sometime last month. The advisory does not name the CVE. That omission matters more than it looks: TeamCity has carried a string of critical authentication-bypass and remote-code-execution flaws over the past two years, and "recently disclosed" without a number means every bank running an on-premise TeamCity instance now has to check its own patch log against a guess. The exposed material was AWS access keys, the kind of credential that unlocks infrastructure, not just source.
For a Hong Kong or Singapore bank, TeamCity sits inside the software supply chain the SFC's operational resilience expectations already cover: a compromised build server can push a poisoned artifact into production without ever touching the production network. The fix isn't patching TeamCity after the fact. It's confirming, before the next CVE lands, that CI/CD service accounts hold time-limited, scoped-down cloud credentials rather than standing AWS keys, so a breached build server yields nothing worth rotating.
No identity or SecOps vendor in the current stack is implicated here; JetBrains is the vendor, and the lesson is architectural. Static AWS keys sitting in a build pipeline are the control that failed, not the absence of a patch.


